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I. Introduction
While the last fifty years have seen the federal government become involved
with macroeconomic and labor market policies to stimulate increased employment,
they also have seen the rapid growth of programs and legislation that seek to
mandate conditions under which workers may be employed. These latter policies
fall under the rubric of "social insurance programs" (e.g., workers' compensa-
tion, unemployment compensation, and the social security retirement, survivors,
and disability programs) and "protective labor legislation" (e.g., minimum wage,
maximum hours, child labor, occupational safety and health, private employees
retirement income security, antidiscrimination, and mandatory retirement laws).
All of these policies seek to mandate protection for workers in areas in
which society perceives that workers have a "right" to be protected. Whether
these be areas of pecuniary compensation (e.g., insurance against unemployment,
work injury, nonwork disability, or promised retirement benefits not being
delivered) or nonpecuniary conditions of employment (e.g., occupational safety
and health), in each case the implicit judgement was reached that private
markets had in some sense failed and that government interven.tion was required.
In each case the policies also led to market repercussions, as federally
mandated changes in the employment relation invariably led employers to react to
the changing constraints they faced. In some cases these responses resulted in
increased employment, however, in other cases they resulted in a reduction in
employment opportunities. 1
This paper focuses on a few directions in which protective labor legisla-
tion might be expanded in the United States over the next decade and the
implications of expansion In each area for employment policy. Somewhat surpris-
ingly to the noninformed observer, perhaps, protective labor legislation Is far
less comprehensive in the United States than it is in many other western
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countries. While this may result from greater union strength in these countries
and unions achieving through legislation many things that are left to the
collective bargaining process in the United States, it does leave much room for
expansion in protective labor legislation here.
For example, while in the United States we have an overtime pay premium to
discourage employers' use of overtime hours and to encourage additional employ-
ment, several European countries have more stringent rules that require prior
governmental or employee approval before any overtime can be worked.2 Or, to
take another example, while for the most part in the United States employers can
unilaterally terminate employees—at—will unless specific contract provisions
protect the workers, in most European countries such dismissals are subject to
various governmental review processes that may lead to reinstatement and/or
severance pay if they are deemed unjust.3
The plan of this paper is as follows. I begin in the next section with a
discussion of hours of work legislation in the United States that presents a
conceptual framework for analyzing proposed changes in protective labor legisla—.
tion. A rationale from the perspective of an analytical labor economist for
many forms of protective labor legislation is that they are attempts to correct
for failures of private markets and overtime hours legislation is analyzed in
this framework. The discussion stresses the need to be explicit about how
private markets have failed, the need for empirical evidence to test such market
failure claims, the need for economic analysis of potential unintended side
effects of proposed policy changes, and empirical estimates of the likely
magnitudes of these effects.
The next three sections adapt this framework to address three areas of
proposed forms of protective labor legislation that have begun to receive public
attention and that have considerable implications for employment policy. These
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respectively are policies relating to "employment at will", "comparable worth",
and plant closings". A brief final section provides some concluding remarks.
II. Rours of Work Legislation4
The overtime pay premium provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
currently regulate only two dimensions of the hours of work relationship, the
number of hours after which the overtime premium goes into effect (forty) and
the premium's level (time and a half). As noted above, in their legislation,
several European countries regulate other dimensions; for example, they require
either prior governmental approval for overtime, for employees to give their
consent to working overtime, or both. A bill to amend the FLSA introduced into
Congress in 1979 by Representative Conyers would similarly have prohibited
mandatory assignment of overtime in the United States, as well as raised the
overtime premium from time arid a half to double time and required premium pay
after 35 rather than 40 hours.5 Although hours of work legislation will
probably not be an area of great legislative effort over the next decade, a
brief summary of the history of such legislation in the United States and a
discussion of my prior attempt to analyze the Conyers proposal will help to
provide the analytic framework I will use throughout this paper.
The earliest forms of hours of work legislation in the United States were
Initiated at the state level, applied to women and children and had the aim of
reducing fatigue and exhaustion.6 For example, in 1879 legislation regulating
maximum hours of work was introduced in Massachusetts, where its supporters
claimed that long workweeks were exhausting and caused women to age prema-
turely.7 The first hours laws covering men in the private sector were also at
the state level and covered occupations in which long workweeks adversely
affected third parties or employees themselves. An 1890 Ohio law limited hours
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of workers who operated trains in the hope that this would reduce railroad
accident rates and protect the traveling public. This law was quickly followed
by state laws limiting workweeks in mining to protect miners, who were subject
to unhealthy and unsafe working conditions.8
In each of these cases a rationale (from the perspective of an analytical
labor economist) for the protective labor legislation Is found in the fact that
the marginal social cost of longer workweeks exceeded the marginal private cost
to employers. In the absence of government intervention these divergencies
persisted because low family income levels did not permit many women and
children the luxury of turning down low wage—long hours jobs, because no good
alternatives to the railroads existed for long—range travel and railroad
passengers were not always accurately informed about railroad employees'
workweeks, and because the limited alternative employment opportunities In
mining communities often restricted the occupational choice of individuals in
those areas. In each case, then, markets failed, in the sense that compensating
wage, or price, differentials did not arise to compensate employees, or third
parties, for the full risks they incurred because of long hours of work. The
case for government intervention was strong; the only real question is why the
legislation took the form of outright restrictions on hours rather than the use
of tax or penalty schemes to increase employers' marginal private cost of longer
hours.9
At the federal level, throughout the early 1930s bills were repeatedly
introduced into Congress to limit the length of the workweek. While the goal of
protecting existing employees from the ills associated with excessive fatigue
remained, a second explicit purpose of such legislation was to Increase employ-
ment by spreading the available work. Ultimately on June 25, 1938, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, with its overtime provisions, was enacted.
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Once again, the provisions of the Act can be rationalized in terms of the
divergence between private and social costs. Even if employers and their
employees in the 1930s were satisfied with long workweeks, their private
calculations Ignored the social costs borne by the unemployed. The time and a
half rate for overtime can be thought of as a tax to make employers bear the
full marginal social cost of their hours decisions; it was meant to reduce the
use of overtime hours and, to the extent that the increased costs do not
substantially reduce total manhours demanded, stimulate employment.'0 Further—
more, if employees were not satIsfied wIth long workweeks during the l930s but,
because of market imperfections, did not have the freedom to choose employment
with employers who orfered shorter workweeks, the direct payment of the tax to
employees who worked longer workweeks can be understood as an attempt to remedy
this imperfectIon.11
Although coverage under the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA has
Increased substantially over the last half century, the premium itself has
remained constant at time and a half. Periodically, as in the Conyers bill,
proposals have been introduced in Congress to raise the premium to double time.
The underlying argument made to support the increase is that while unemployment
remains a pressing national problem, the use of overtime hours has increased in
recent years. Moreover, the argument follows, since the enactment of the FLSA,
the deterrent effect of the overtime premium on the use of overtime has been
weakened by the growing share of hiring and training costs, fringe benefits, and
government mandated insurance premiums in total compensation. Many of these
costs are quasi—fixed or employee related (e.g., vacation pay, holiday pay, sick
leave, hiring costs), rather than hours related, in the sense that they do not
vary with overtime hours. An increase in these quasi—fixed costs reduces
employers' marginal costs of working their employees overtime relative to their
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costs of hiring additional employees. The growth of these costs, it is claimed,
has been at least partially responsible for the increase in overtime and
therefore an increase in the overtime premium paid by employers is required to
offset this adverse effect.
A complete analyses of the desirability of raising the overtime premium
requires answers to a number of empirical questions. Would higher overtime pay
rates relative to the quasi—fixed costs of employment induce employers to reduce
their usage of overtime hours? Would reductions in overtime hours be "con-
verted" to full—time jobs or "lost" to capital substitution or output reduc-
tions? Would employers comply with the legislation? Would workers who previ-
ously worked overtime, moonlight at second jobs and reduce the employment oppor—
tunities for unemployed individuals? Would the unemployed have the skills
necessary to fill any new jobs that might be potentially created? Finally, what
would be the Income distribution consequences of the proposed policy change?
Empirical analyses directed at answering all of these questions led us to
conclude that raising the overtime premium would not be an effective way of
stimulating employment growth, even though it would lead to a reduction in
overtime hours, and that it would not have desirable income distribution
consequences. 12
Raising the overtime premium paid by employers might make sense for another
reason, however, if the revenue that would accrue from such an Increase was not
distributed to employees in the form of higher premium pay received by them for
overtime. Instead, the revenue from any increase in the tax on overtime would
go directly to aid the unemployed; for example it could be contributed to the
unemployment insurance fund or to employment and training program budgets.
Unless It can be demonstrated that market imperfections prevent currently
employed workers from freely choosing the length of their workweeks and that the
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existing overtime premium does not fully compensate these workers for the
disutility associated with long workweeks, then no increase in the premium paid
to employees is justified. One can thus logically be in favor of raising the
tax paid by employers when they use overtime hours but not in favor of raising
the overtime premium paid to employees.
What about the Conyers proposal to legislate the prohibition of mandatory
overtime, as is done in several European countries. Presumably such a proposal
can be viewed as being based upon the belief that market imperfections persist
in the labor market and that the overtime premium does not fully compensate
employees for the disutility associated with mandatory overtime. One may
question, however, if markets have failed here. There appear to be a variety of
overtime hours provisions offered in the labor market; for example, only 16
percent of the individuals in the 1977 Michigan Quality of Employment Survey who
reported working overtime also reported that the overtime hours decision was
made unilaterally by their employer and that overtime was mandatory in the sense
that employees who refused it suffered a penalty.'3 In addition, roughly 20
percent of employees covered by major collective bargaining agreements in 1976
had explicit provisions in their contracts that gave them the right to refuse
overtime.14
To the extent that labor markets are competitive and establishments do
offer a variety of ove-rtime hours provisions (e.g., employer determines,
employee determines, penalty for refusal), compensating wage differentials
should arise. To attract labor, establishments that offered distasteful
mandatory overtime provisions would have to pay higher straight—time wages,
higher overtime premiums, or higher fringe benefits than establishments in which
such provisions did not occur. If fully compensating wage differentials exist,
there is no case for legislative prohibitions against mandatory overtime.
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Evidence on the extent to which such compensating wage differentials currently
do exist is of importance to policy makers.
In fact, the only empirical study done on the topic found that, on average,
such compensating differentials did not exist.'5 This provides some support in
favor of a prohibition of mandatory overtime, although the benefits from such
legislation would have to be weighed against the potential costs; the latter
include reduced employer flexibility in scheduling production, and thus,
increased production costs, which would lead in turn to lower employment levels.
The study also found, however, that compensating differentials did exist for
union members. That is, unions were able to win for their members through the
collective bargaining process what the market on average did not produce.'6 The
workers most "in need" of the prohibition on mandatory overtime then are
nonunion workers.
III. Employment—At—Will
Judging by the spate of articles in both academic journals and the popular.
press, reform of the employment—at—will doctrine to provide nonunion workers
with protection against "unjust dismissal" appears to be one of the most
pressing labor issues of the decade.'7 Put in simplest terms, the doctrine of
employment—at—will asserts that both employers and employees have the right to
terminate an employment relationship at any time. Of concern to workers is that
under such a system they have no statutory protection against arbitrary deci-
sions by employers to dismiss them.
Unlike virtually all European nations, which have specific legislation that
prohibit unjust dismissals and that often mandate the use of labor courts and/or
industrial tribunals to resolve disputes, for the most part in the United States
the doctrine of employment—at—will continues to prevail.18 Unionized workers
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with specific contract provisions that govern discharges, as well as tenured
teachers and workers under some civil service systems are not subject to this
doctrine and all workers receive some protection if they are dismissed for
reasons that are prohibited under other federal statutes (e.g., race, sex, or
age discrimination) since they may file suit for remedy under those statutes.
Estimates, however, are that over 60 million workers in the United States have
virtually no protection against unjust dismissal.'9
Concern over the issue arises because it is also estimated that each year
around 4 to 5 percent of the labor force are discharged from their jobs.2° While
the majority of these discharges may be justified, due to willful and
deliberate misconduct, some may be unrelated to a worker's productivity on the
job and/or the penalty of dismissal may seem excessive relative to the workers
actions.
In the union sector, where contract language Often protects workers from
arbitrary dismissals, discharge rates tend to be lower.2' Moreover, approx-
imately half of unionized workers who are discharged and who appeal these
discharges through an arbitration process, as specified in their contracts, are
reinstated.22 One researcher has estimated that if nonunion workers had similar
rights to appeal their dismissals to impartial arbitrators and did so at the
same rate that dismissed union workers did, that approximately 150,000 dis-
charged nonunion workers would be reinstated each year.23 To the extent that
these workers suffer serious economic losses, employers are not bearing the full
marginal social cost of unjustly dismissing workers, and a case for government
intervention may exist.
In recent years, public policy In the United States relating to the
employment—at—will Issue has preceeded primarily through state judiciary
systems. As of 1984,more than twenty state courts had adopted "public policy"
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or "whistle—blowing" exceptions to the doctrine. In these states workers cannot
be discharged for actions that are consistent with public policy (e.g., refusing
an employer's request to commit perjury, refusing an employer's request not to
serve on a jury, reporting a violation of an OSHA standard). Similarly,
thirteen state courts had adopted "implicit contract" exceptions. In these
states, some of which also have public policy exceptions, workers cannot be
dismissed "without cause" if actions taken by the employer (e.g., oral state-
ments, established past practices, statements in personnel manuals) implicitly
promises such protection.24
These exceptions, however, appear to apply primarily to those dismissed
executive and managerial employees who have the financial resources necessary to
pursue redress through the courts. The majority of discharged workers are lower
level blue—collar workers whose reasons for dismissal typically don't fall under
the exceptions.25 While several state legislatures have introduced bills
requiring "just cause" for dismissal and requiring mediation and/or arbitration
of disputes, no state bill has come to vote since 1975, and the only federal
attempt at such legislation similarly failed to come to vote.26 Some observers
have argued that a federal statute is required and pressure for such legislation
may continue to build.27
To understand the potential rationale for such legislation, it is useful,
as in the previous section, to consider several models of the labor market.28
Consider first a simple competitive labor market with many buyers and sellers of
labor, in which skills of workers are completely general, in the sense that a
worker's productivity is not firm—specific. In such a world, proponents of the
employment—at—will doctrine argue that it is an equitable or fair form of
contract since either party can terminate the contract at will. Workers can
quit if they perceive better opportunities elsewhere and firms can dismiss
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workers if they perceive that workers' productivity has fallen below their
wages. In the latter case dismissed workers would suffer no permanent loss,
since their skills would be perfectly transferable. However, since job search
takes time, there would be a loss of income during the job search process. How
large the loss of income would be in part depends upon whether being dismissed
adversely affects the time it takes to find a job.
Proponents of employment—at—will also argue that it is an efficient form of
contract since either party can terminate it if the other party reneges on the
agreement. Knowledge that each party reserves this right decreases the chances
that workers will not put forth expected levels of performance and that em-
ployers will not provide promised pecuniary and nonpecuniary forms of compensa-
tion. Thus, efficiency is promoted and monitoring costs are reduced.
If in such a world an employer justly discharges a worker for malfeasance,
the worker might suffer a loss of income but this loss would be deserved.
Proponents claim that firms would have little incentive to unjustly discharge
workers because information that they were doing so would reduce the attractive-
ness of the firm to prospective future employees and increase voluntary turnover
of existing employees. On both counts, employers' labor costs would go up;
unjust discharges would lead to"reputational costs" and would be costly to the
f irui.
In evaluating potential losses to workers from unjust discharges, it is
useful to consider four different situations. First, consider the employment
relation in casual or secondary labor markets; markets in which neither firms
nor workers have incentives to maintain stable long—term relationships. In such
markets, workers frequently voluntarily or involuntarily change jobs and the
stigma from being dismissed is not likely to be a permanent one. The loss to
workers from unjust dismissal are likely to be only short—run in nature.
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Next, consider the situation I have previously discussed; a situation of
competitive labor markets with completely general skills. We know that in such
a world workers bear the full costs of acquiring skills and hence firms have no
Investments in workers.29 Reputational costs would discourage firms from
unjustly dismissing workers, however if they did, permanent losses to workers
would occur only if information about the workers' true productivity could not
eventually overcome the signal given by their dismissals.
Third, consider the situatiän in which skills are firm—specific. In this
case workers and firms share the cost of training and have incentives to
maintain stable relationships.3° Firms would appear to have little incentive
to unjustly dismiss workers; if they did, however, dismissed workers' losses
might be permanent because their productivity with other employers would be
lower.
Finally, consider the situation of general skills, where firms use upward
sloping age—earnings profiles to motivate increased attachment and increased
productivity by employees.3' With such Implicit contracts, workers are init-
ially paid less than their marginal product but eventually are paid more. While
reputational costs would discourage firms from unjustly dismissing workers who
were in the stage of their life—cycles in which marginal productivity was less
than wages, if they did, these workers would suffer permanent losses.
Proponents of employment—at—will essentially would argue then that in
structured internal labor markets, where workers and firms have long—term
attachment, there are strong incentives for employers not to unjustly discharge
workers (the last two situations). In casual labor markets, or markets where
general training prevails (the first two situations), there are fewer incen-
tives, however in these cases it appears that discharged workers' losses would
only be temporary. Given the perceived benefits from allowing employment—at—
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will, any policy recommendation should relate to short—term compensation for
unjust discharge, not to restricting employers' rights to dismiss workers.
Moreover, proponents would argue that once government restricts employers'
rights to dismiss workers, it opens up the possibility of future restrictions on
other dimensions of the employment relation such as promotion, transfers, and
lesser disciplinary actions.
Critics of employment—at—will, of course, would disagree with this analy-
sis. They would argue that labor markets are not competitive and that firms
have dominant power. Worker opportunities may well be limited by the structure
of labor markets and the absence of viable alternatives implies that dismissed
workers may suffer permanent losses. .If worker alternatives are limited, firms
need not fear any reputational costs associated with unjust dismissals. More-
over, since discharges are almost always an individual rather than a collective
phenomenon, it is unlikely in any case that potential employees would be aware
of any discharges (let alone unjust ones) and thus that firms would suffer any
reputational costs. Viewed in this way, employment—at—will does not seem
equitable and seems to favor employers over employees. They focus on modifying
this policy because of the severe costs they feel It imposes on unjustly
dismissed workers; costs which are much more severe than any other personnel
action a firm may take.32
The case then for modifying employment—at—will is similar to the case for
Intervening in the overtime hours decision. If labor markets are not competi-
tive, employers will not take the full marginal social cost of unjust dismissals
into account in making dismissal decisions. Specifically, they will Ignore the
social costs of involuntary unemployment and/or dismissed workers having to
accept jobs at wages that are not commensurate with their productivity. Viewed
this way, the appropriate policy recommendation is to put a "tax" on unjust
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dismissals to increase employers' costs of taking such actions. In fact, this
is exactly what the policy of a number of European countries is, calling for
severance pay if dismissals are found to be unjust.33
Ultimately, of course, which position is correct and the appropriate public
policy depend upon the answers to a number of questions. What are the charac-
teristics of people who are unjustly dismissed? Do they suffer prolonged spells
of uneniploynient? Do they suffer permanent earnings losses from their dismissal?
Not surprisingly, given that data do not permit us to distinguish unjust from
just dismissals, we currently have answers to none of these questions. Some
studies, however, do provide information on related questions.
First, as compared to unemployment insurance recipients, unemployed workers
who are disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because they
were dismissed for misconduct tend to be younger, lower wage, nonwhite, and
unmarried.34 Dismissal rates also tend to be higher at small firms than at
large firms and for short—term employees than for long—term employees.35
Together, these facts suggest that dismissed workers are often short—term
employees in casual labor markets; a situation in which I argued above that
unjust dismissal is likely to lead only to temporary earnings loss.
Second, survey information suggests that employers are less likely to hire
an employee dismissed for cause, than they are one who was laid—off or who
voluntarily quit.36 Yet data on durations of spells of unemployment from five
states suggest that in two of the states where workers dismissed for misconduct
were disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance for the duration of
their spell, these durations of unemployment were considerably shorter than
those of otherwise comparable unemployment Insurance recipients.37 Denial of
unemployment insurance benefits apparently prods discharged workers to return to
employment relatively quickly and, on average, they succeed, even if employers
—15—
are less willing to hire them. For the most part these discharged workers were
unemployed for only relatively short spells.
We have no information, though, on the post—unemployment earnings loss
suffered by these dismissed workers vis—a—vis the losses suffered by unemploy-
ment insurance recipients; one might suspect that the lack of unemployment
insurance benefits causes the former to settle for lower positions. Moreover,
we do not even have any information on the absolute magnitudes of the post—
unemployment earnings losses for discharged workers. Without such information
for unjustly dismissed workers, it is difficult to suggest what the appropriate
policy should be.
It is interesting to note, however, that public policy in European countries
typically takes the form of first mediation and then formal labor court or
industrial tribunal proceedings, with workers deemed to be unjustly discharged
being awarded severance pay. In most cases the severance pay is short—run,
rarely exceeding six months in duration.38 Reinstatement is rare; this makes
sense in terms of our analytical framework, in that raising the cost to
employers of "unjust" discharges is more efficient than an outright prohibition
of the action.
One possible reform then is to propose federal legislation on the subject.
For example, one might require that discharge disputes go to arbitration or
industrial tribunals atid that severance pay be awarded in cases of "unjust"
discharges. Rather than expanding the federal bureaucracy, however, it may make
more sense to work within existing state legislation, specifically those dealing
with unemployment insurance.
All states currently penalize unemployed workers who have been discharged
due to misconduct connected with work and who apply for unemployment insurance
benefits. While each state has its own interpretation of misconduct, misconduct
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typically includes violations of company rules, insubordination, refusal to
perform work, and excessive absences. In a number of states it must be "willful
and deliberate" for a penalty to occur. Fifteen states provide benefits to
penalized individuals after a waiting period of typically three to ten weeks,
while the remainder disqualify these individuals for at least their duration of
unemployment.39 It is interesting to note that of the fifteen states that
provide benefits after a waiting period, the judiciary in only one, Nebraska,
currently has adopted an implicit contract exception to the employment—at—will
doctrine. Apparently the judiciary Is acting asif the provision of some
unemployment insurance benefits to discharged workers may reduce the pressure
they feel to adopt implicit contract exemptions, although they never mention
such benefits in their decisions.
Given that the provision of unemployment insurance benefits to unjustly
dismissed workers would provide financial support similar to severance pay
benefits, one wonders why pressure for refordoes not take the form of devising
ways to have state unemployment insurance systems more rigorously examine
"dismissals for misconduct" and to encourage them to award benefits without
extra waiting periods in cases in which the dismissal was deemed excessive.40
While this might require claim evaluators to hold more thorough and expeditious
hearings than they currently do, in principle this type of examination is what
the system should be doing anyway. The only weakness of this approach is that
to the extent that the unemployment insurance payroll tax is not perfectly
experience—rated, employers would still not be bearing the full marginal social
cost of their dismissal decisions.4'
Moving away from an employment—at—will policy would not be costless.
Suppose, as in many European nations, we moved towards a system of using labor
courts or industrial tribunals to resolve discharge grievances for nonunionized
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employees. To the extent that doing so increases employers' costs of termina-
ting workers, it should induce them to devote more resources to ascertaining
the likely productivity of potential applicants and to more frequently termina-
ting workers prior to the end of their probationary periods.42 In a growing
economy, the result would be a slow—down in the rate of growth of employment,
with the lost employment opportunities being concentrated among lower produc-
tivity workers (where minimum wage laws prevent employers from offering low
initial wages to compensate for uncertainty about productivity). We also should
expect to see increased turnover of members of this group during their proba-
tionary periods. The limited data cited earlier suggest that dismissals are
currently concentrated among low—skilled workers in casual employment relation-
ships and it seems ironic that the very group that It is hoped would be pro-
tected by the policy change, would be the group that would appear to bear most
of the cost of the change.
It is also not clear what the effect of moving further away from an
employment—at—will policy would be on the level of unionization in the economy.
European nations are much more heavily unionized than the United States and this
has allowed the unions to win through national legislation many things which
more typically would be part of collective bargaining agreements In the United
States. Limitations on the rights of employers to assign overtime and dismiss
workers are two examples. Strong national unions led to these policies in
Europe, not visa ersa.
Some people argue that limitations on employment—at—will in the United
States would be a pro—union policy. They argue that unions have the skills to
represent nonunion workers in cases involving unjust dismissals and that
nonunion employers'resistance to unions would diminish if nonunion workers
legislatively were granted the protection that union contracts often provide.
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Hence, passage of such legislation might stimulate the growth of unions. Others
argue, however, that legislative provision of this protection would decrease the
demand for union services and hence would hurt unions.
A careful econometric study using data on unionization rates by state
during the 1964—1980 period found that the adoption by state judiciary of
implicit contract exceptions to the employment—at—will doctrine seemed to be
associated with a decline in unionization rates, suggesting that passage of
national legislation would have an adverse effect on unions.43 However, while
unions tend not to place the issue of employment—at—will high on their legisla-
tive agendas and have not actively lobbied for the passage of unjust discharge
protection bills at the state level, in general they have been supportive of
such legislation.44 This is not the first time that econometric evidence on the
effects of labor market legislation on union growth has had little effect on the
positions unions take with respect to the legislation.45
IV. Comparable Worth
Some two decades after the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title
VII of the 1964 CIvil Rights Act, which together prohibit (among other things)
sex discrimination in wages on any given job and sex discrimination in access to
employment opportunities, it is still common to observe that on average females
earn less than males, females are distributed across occupations in a quite
different manner than males, and earnings in occupations that are dominated by
females tend to be lower than earnings in those dominated by males, even after
one controls for traditional proxies for productivity.47 The frustrations
generated by these outcomes have led to pressure for the adoption of the
principle of comparable worth, a principle that at least one participant in the
debate has called "the women's issue of the 1980s."48
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Put in simplest terms, proponents of comparable worth assert that jobs
within a firm can be valued in terms of the skill, effort, and responsibility
they require, as well as the working conditions they offer. Two jobs would be
said to be of comparable worth to a firm if they were comparable in terms of
these characteristics. The principle of comparable worth asserts that within a
firm, jobs that are of comparable worth to the firm should receive equal
compensation.
While some efforts to implement comparable worth have taken place in the
private sector, the major push for comparable worth has occurred in the state
and local government sector.49 By the mid 1960s over a dozen states had passed
comparable worth legislation covering state employees, although these laws were
rarely enforced. Starting with a 1974 State of Washington study, a number of
states have undertaken formal job evaluation studies to see how their compensa-
tion systems mesh with the principle of comparable worth.5° In several cases,
this has led to "voluntary" implementation of comparable worth through the
legislative and collective bargaining processes (e.g., Minnesota, Connecticut,
New York), or to court ordered implementation (Washington).51 By the summer of
1985, over a dozen states had begun the process of implementing some form of
comparable iorth in their employees' compensation systems.
Comparable worth initiatives have also been undertaken at the local level
in over 50 cities, counties, and school districts. Many of these units are in
the states of California, Minnesota and Washington. Comparable worth wage
adjustments were implemented in San Jose, California after a well—publicized
strike of municipal employees over the size of the adjustments and the publicity
this strike received undoubtedly influenced the spread to other California
units. Minnesota passed a law in April 1984 requiring political subdivisions to
do job evaluations and then to revise their compensation structure in accord
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with comparable worth. Finally, the early Washington comparable worth study
mentioned above attracted attention to the issue in that state.
At the federal level, hearings on comparable worth have been conducted by
several Congressional committees.52 While support for the principle has been
espoused by some Congressional Democrats, in 1985 the U.S. Civil Rights Commis-
sion and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, both dominated by
Reagan administration appointees, each came out against comparable worth.53
Once again we can consider a simple stylized competitive labor market model
to understand the cases for and against comparable worth.54 In a competitive
labor market a firm hires employees In an occupation or job category until the
category's marginal product equals its real wage. A category's marginal product
represents Its "worth" to an employer. However, this is not necessarily fixed
over time, but rather depends upon the number of employees hired in the category
and all other job categories, the quantity of capital available to employees to
work with, the production technology, and the quality of employees in the
various job categories. The worth of a job then can not be determined indepen-
dent of the qualifications of its incumbents and may well change over time.
This suggests that job evaluation surveys cannot be a one—shot event, but rather
must be constantly updated; the worth of a job to an employer is not necessarily
constant over time.55
Now move to the level of the labor market as a whole. The aggregation of
individual firm's demand curves for each occupation leads to market demand
curves for the occupation. The supply of labor to each occupation/job category
will depend upon workers' qualifications, the pecuniary and nonpecuniary forms
of compensation every job offers and the distribution of preferences across
workers for the various jobs. If there are no barriers to occupational mobil-
ity, a worker will move between jobs until the "net advantage" he or she
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perceives from each is equalized. Such movements lead to an equilibrating
structure of occupational wage differentials; this depends upon the distribution
of workers' qualifications and "tastes" for the various jobs.
In this stylized competitive world, all of the factors that comparable
worth advocates believe should affect wages (skill, effort, responsibility, and
working conditions) would affect wages, since these factors would influence the
underlying supply and demand schedules. However, the weight the market would
place on each factor in determining wages would reflect the entire distribution
of employees' tastes for, and employers' valuation of, each factor, not neces-
sarily the weight assigned by a job evaluation scheme. Put another way, If
workers have heterogeneous preferences with respect to various nonpecuniary
conditions of employment, the relative wage each occupation would pay would
depend upon employers' relative demands for the various occupations. Job
characteristics would not be the only determinant of wages.56
If in such a world females clustered into lower—paying occupations than
males who had comparable productivity related characteristics (e.g., education),
this would reflect only systematic differences in tastes between males and
females for the nonpecuniary characteristics offered by the various jobs. For
example, married females with children might have strong preferences for jobs
that do not require travel, long hours, or work that must be brought home in the
evenings. Given their preferences, males and females would have made optimal
career choices and no government intervention would be required.
Of course, this conclusion presupposes the validity of the assumptions of
the model and there are a number that proponents of comparable worth seriously
challenge. The first is the assumption that there are no barriers to occupa-
tional mobility. If women are systematically excluded from high paying occupa-
tions, one cannot claim that the structure of earnings is the result of volun—
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tary choice. A market economist would respond that an appropriate long—run
remedy in this case would be to break down occupational barriers through actions
including rigorous enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. However,
such actions would provide only for gradual improvement of the welfare of the
discriminated against group, as they would have to wait for vacancies to occur
in the higher paying male jobs. In addition, for jobs that require training,
this policy would benefit primarily new entrants whose time horizons are
sufficiently long to enable them to profitably undertake the necessary training.
In the absence of a policy that could 1) create "male" jobs for all
qualified females who want them, 2) identify the older women whom historic
discrimination prevented froni making different occupational choices early in
their lives and who now could not afford to profitably undertake the necessary
investment if the barriers to entry were broken, and 3) would provide resources
to these women now so that they could undertake the training, it could be argued
that a policy calling for comparable worth might make sense. Its justification
would be based on equity considerations; one would have to conclude that these
would outweigh any efficiency losses that might result. Sone of these losses
are discussed below.
The second assumption challenged is that wages in female dominated occupa-
tions are determined in competitive markets. There is considerable evidence that
employers in some female dominated occupations, such as public school teachers
and hospital nurses, appear to have monopsony power.57 As is well—known, in
this circumstance there is a range over which one can"legislate" a higher wage
without suffering any employment loss. Whether the wage that would be set under
a comparable worth wage policy would fall in such a range cannot be determined a
priori and, in any case, the vast majority of females are not employed in these
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occupations. A remedy that insures that employers in these markets actively
compete for workers might make more sense than comparable worth.58
The case for comparable worth thus seems to rest on the argument that the
current occupational distribution of female employees is based on discriminatory
barriers which existing legislation has not broken down. Even if one could
enforce these laws, breaking down barriers does not help experienced older
workers who have invested heavily in occupation—specific training and whose time
horizon is now too short to profitably undertake new occupational investments.
Comparable worth is one of several policies that could provide a remedy for
these workers.59 Whether it is a desirable policy depends upon one's percep-
tions of how the benefits it provides contrast with the efficiency losses it
Induces. Just as with one's perception about the value of the minimum wage,
given the trade—offs involved, ultimately one's position on comparable worth
must depend on value judgements.
Assuming one wants to seriously consider comparable worth as a national
policy, there are a number of issues that must be addressed. First, there are a
host of questions relating to the usefulness of current job evaluation methods
for comparable worth studies. These include, but are not limited to, questions
of sex bias In describing or evaluating jobs, the question of which character-
istics should be valued, the statistical reliability of raters' evaluations, the
correlation of ratings under alternative job evaluation methods, and whether
market wages should be used in the determination of the'weights" different job
attributes should receive. There is considerable debate over these issues,
primarily by noneconomists, and the interested reader can pursue this debate
elsewhere. 60
Second, supporters of comparable worth are quite explicit that the concept
is to apply to individual employers and that job evaluation schemes are to be
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establishment or firm—specific. This immediately suggests that, like many
other forms of protective wage legislation, comparable worth legislation would
have to have size class exemptions, because only relatively large firms would
have enough employees to meaningfully consider conducting formal job evalua-
tions. Comparable worth laws would apply then only to relatively large firms.
Now to the extent that a comparable worth wage policy succeeded in raising
the wages of women in such large covered establishments, one might be tempted to
deem the policy to be a success. However, this ignores several market repercus-
sions that would occur.61 Employers in the covered sector would have an
incentive to substitute male employees for female employees; thus we should
observe a decline in female employment in this sector. To the extent that scale
effects outweigh substitution effects, a decline in male employment in the
covered sector should also occur. If these displaced male and female workers
seek employment in small firms in the noncovered sector, wages of both males and
females there would fall. Hence, while some women would gain (women who keep
their jobs In large firms In the covered sector), other women would lose (women
who lose their covered sector jobs and women Initially employed in small firms
in the noncovered sector). It is unclear whether women as a group, on balance,
would actually gain.
In part, the answer depends upon the magnitude of the disemployment
effects. One study of Australia, where the implementation of a comparable worth
type system via wage tribunals saw the average female/male earnings ratio in the
economy rise from .61 to .76 over a five—year period, concluded that the policy
change decreased the rate of growth of female employment by 1.3 percent a
year.62 This was approximately one—third the actual rate of growth of female
employment during the period, so it represents a rather substantial decline.
The same study concluded that the female unemployment rate was about .5 percent
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higher at the end of the period, than it would have been in the absence of the
comparable worth policy.
In the United States comparable worth wage policies are only beginning to
be implemented, and then primarily in the state and local sector. As a result,
estimated disemployment effects can be obtained only from simulations that use
estimated systems of demand curves for male and female employees to provide
estimates of male/female substitution as relative wages change. A detailed
study of the state and local sector concluded that a 20 percent comparable worth
wage adlustment for all females in the sector, would lead to only a 2 to 3
percent decline in female employment in the sector.63 While one might expect
gender substitution, and hence disemloyment effects, to be greater in the
private sector, existing studies of male/female substitutability in the private
sector are not sufficiently precise to allow one to draw this conclusion.64
In part, the answer also depends on whether women are employed dispropor-
tionately in the covered (large firm) or noncovered (small firm) sectors, the
magnitude of the male/female wage differential in each sector, and the wage
differentials between sectors? If women are disproportionately employed in
small firms with large male/female wage differentials, which pay much less than
large firms, on balance women as a group may lose by the policy. While It is
well—established that wage levels vary by size class, evidence on the other
questions is only sketchy. One study did find, however, that the proportionate
representation of women in the U.S. manufacturing firms declines with establish-
ment size.65
Furthermore, if comparable worth is a firm—specific policy, it will do
nothing to eliminate male/female wage differentials that exist because of
differences in the sex distribution of employees across Industries or across
size classes of establishments within an industry. To the extent that women are
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concentrated in low wage industries and/or low wage small firms, comparable
worth will have only a limited effect on the average male/female wage differen-
tial in the economy.66
Of course, a comparable worth wage policy might have supply—side effects.
On the one hand, it would reduce the incentive females have to obtain training
for higher paying "male" occupations, since increasing the wage in "female"
occupations via comparable worth wage adjustments would reduce the return to
training Investments; this would lead to another efficiency loss. On the other
hand, such wage adjustments might increase the attractiveness of "female"
occupations to males and reduce the extent to which females were excluded from
ma1e" occupations, since the wage advantage in "male" jobs would be smaller or
no longer exist. We have no information on the likely magnitudes of these
responses, which further hinders our evaluation of such a policy.
V. Plant Closing Legislation
Most European nations have some form of legislation relating to plant
closings or large scale layoffs.67 Typically they call for, advanced notice by
employers and employer negotiations with employees and government over whether
the closing can be averted. Often they require severance pay for displaced
workers and some, for example Sweden, have detailed programs of labor market
services (retraining, placement, public works, wage subsidies) to facilitate
adjustments. Canada similarly requires advance notice. In many of these
countries small establishments with less than one—hundred employees are exempt
from the requirements, perhaps due to the greater failure rate of small busi-
nesses or the belief that a shut down of a small business does not have a
substantial effect on a community.
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Plant closing legislation in the- United States is much more modest.68 As of
early 1985, there is no federal law and only four state laws. Two, Maine and
Wisconsin, require advance notice of plant shutdowns (with size class exemp-
tions), and Maine also requires one week's severance pay per year of service for
workers with greater than three years tenure. Connecticut, does not require
advanced notice, but does require nonbankrupt firms to maintain health insurance
and other benefits for workers unemployed by plant shutdowns for up to ninety
days. Massachusetts similarly requires maintenance of health insurance and
encourages, but does not require, advanced notice and severance pay.
Interest in plant closing legislation in the United States has grown since
the deep recession of the taid—1970s and the relatively large number of plant
closings and permanent layoffs in major manufacturing industries since then,
undoubtedly stimulated this interest.69 During the 1975—83 period over 125
bills relating to plant closings were introduced in 30 states; the majority in
the northeast and midwest.71 More than ninety percent of these.bills had provisions
requiring advanced notice of shutdowns, while substantially smaller percentages.
required severance pay or economic assistance to either workers, employers,
local governments, or potential buyers.
At the federal level, some 40 bills have been introduced into Congress
since 1979. The National Employment Priorities Act, first sponsored by Gerald
Ford and Walter Mondale in 1974, was active in Congress as HR 2847 in 1983 and,
if passed, would have required advance notice if over fifteen percent of
employees in- an establishment were expected to lose their jobs due to a plant
closing or relocation. Among its other provisions, it also called for severance
pay for displaced workers along with weekly income maintenance benefits while
they were unemployed for up to one year at eight—five percent of previous wages
(one hundred percent If a worker was enrolled in a training program), mairiten—
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ance of all benefit and insurance plans, for the firm to pay relocation allow-
ances if jobs were available in other establishments it operated, and for the
firm to make payments for a year to the community in which the business was
located to compensate it for lost tax revenue. A weaker form of the bill,
HR1616 was reported to the floor of the House in 1985. It required employers to
give 90 days advance notice of a plant shutdown or layoff involving at least 50
employees and for employers to consult with the employees or their union about
the potential displacement.
Proponents of plant closing legislation argue that advance notice provi-
sions will ease displaced workers' shock and facilitate their search for alternative
sources of employment or training. Such notice also allows employers, workers
and the community to see if ways exist to save the jobs, such as wage conces-
sions, tax concessions, or seeking new ownership, including the possibility of
employee ownership. If plants do shut, the maintenance of health insurance
provide needed service for individuals during a period when stress leads to
increased incidence of physical and mental ailments.72 Finally payments by
firms to the communities in which the plants were located would help alleviate
the extra demands placed on these communities for social services that the
shutdowns cause; demands that would arise at the same time that local property
and sales tax revenue were being reduced.
Opponents of the legislation argue that, in addition to restricting the
free mobility of capital, advance notice legislation would have a number of
other adverse effects on firms.73 They claim it would increase worker turnover
and decrease productivity, as those productive workers with the best oppor-
tunities elsewhere would leave and the morale of remaining workers would suffer.
It also would decrease the likelihood that buyers of the plant's product would
place new orders, that banks would supply new credit, that suppliers would
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continue to provide services, and that the firm could sell the plant to poten-
tial buyers. Finally, it would depress corporate stock prices. Such a provi-
sion, plus the others that directly increase the costs of plant shutdowns,
effectively increase the cost of reducing employment and thus should encourage
firms not to expand operation in states where such laws are in effect. Opponents
argue then that it is a self—defeating regional policy, in that, if adopted, it
would discourage creation of new jobs in snowbelt states.
In evaluating the case for plant closing legislation, it is again useful to
stress the divergence between private and social costs. Employers currently do
not bear the full social costs of plant shutdowns, both because unemployment
insurance is imperfectly experience rated and because the costs these actions
impose on communities are not taken into account by them. As such, imposing a
"taX" on plant closings makes sense; it would have the effect of discouraging
the action. Of course, to avoid depressing new employment growth in snowbelt
states, the tax would have to be nationwide; critics have inadvertently sup-
ported the case for federal instead of state legislation.74
Two additional points should be noted. First, the community effects of
worker displacement depend partially upon the number of jobs lost relative to
the size of the local labor market. In a given size market, it is hard to
ascertain what the differential effects on the community would be of an estab-
lishment with one hundred employees shutting down, of an establishment with one
thousand employees permanently laying off one hundred of them, or of one hundred
establishments each laying off one employee. Viewed this way, size class
exemptions under the law make less sense, as does the distinction between plant
shutdown and layoff. In addition, the costs the community faces for any given
displacement will be higher the smaller is the local labor market and the higher
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is the area unemployment rate. The latter suggests that the "tax per displaced
worker should increase as unemployment rates increase.
Second, to say that employers should pay a "tax" on plant closings does not
necessarily imply that the revenue from this tax should go to displaced workers
in the form of severance pay, just as an increase in the tax on overtime should
not necessarily go to workers In the form of an increased overtime premium (see
Section II). However, if displaced workers' losses are greater than those
incurred by other unemployed workers covered by the unemployment insurance
system and If it can be shown that these losses were not already compensated for
by the market in the form of higher pre—uneiiiployment wages, a case for worker
compensation might be made on equity grounds.
To understand the losses workers suffer from a plant shutdown or permanent
layoff, it is useful to again consider several simple competitive labor
market models. Consider initially the situation in which all skills are
perfectly general. In this case workers would accept jobs with an employer
whose risk of shutdown or permanent layoff were high only if they received a
wage premium to compensate them for their lost earnings during the time they
expected to be unemployed searching for new employment. In such a world, worker
losses would only be transitory, since their skills are assumed to be perfectly
general. Their post—unemployment wages might be less than their pre—unemploy—
merit wages, however this would reflect only that they had moved to less risky
jobs. This points out that a comparison of post— to pre—unemployment wages may
overstate the permanent losses workers face.
In fact, several studies suggest that labor markets do compensate workers
for their risk of unemployment; jobs with higher risk of subsequent unemploy-
ment, ceteris paribus, pay higher wages. While the provision of unemployment
insurance indicates that society believes that markets are not working per—
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fectly, the same studies also suggest that as expected, higher unemployment
insurance benefits lead to smaller wage premiums for risk of unemployment.75
Permanent losses for workers would occur, however, if workers had pre-
viously invested in firm—specific skills and they did not anticipate layoffs or
plant closings. In this situation, post—unemployment earnings would be less
than current earnings and no predisplacement wage differential would have arisen
to compensate these workers for the risk involved in their investments. When
industries reach a period of decline (e.g., auto and steel), it is likely that
potential new etnployees(to the extent that there are any) will be aware of the
risks and will demand wage premiums to compensate them. However, older workers
who invested decades earlier when times were good, would be "locked—in" to the
Industry because of the specificity of their skills and would receive no
compensating differentials.
The notion that compensating wage differentials for risk of unemployment
will arise primarily for workers with relatively short job tenure has not been
tested. The study of mandatory overtime cited in Section II did find, however,
that compensating wage differentials for that unfavorable job characteristic
existed only for employees with less than three years tenure.76 To the extent
that this result carries over to risk of unemployment, permanent losses would be
suffered primarily by workers with long tenure. This Implies that severance pay
plans and job assistance programs for displaced workers should focus on workers
with relatively long tenure. As noted earlier, the Maine law requires three
years tenure for severance pay and then increases severance pay with experience.
Such a structure makes sense.77
One must be aware, though, that since employers share the costs of invest-
ment iii firm-specific training, they also will share the losses from unantici-
pated (at the time of the training) plant closings. To make them pay for the
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above programs for senior workers with specific training would increase their
loses and discourage all employers from making future investments in firm—
specific training. To avoid this perverse incentive, in the presence of
specific training such programs might be funded out of general revenues.
The situation would be very different, however, if employees worked in
structured internal labor markets where employers used upward sloping age—
earnings profiles to motivate increased attachment and productivity by employ-
ees. As noted in Section III, in such a world workers are initially paid less
than the marginal productIvity but eventually are paid more. Over theIr expected
tenure with the firm they receive an expected present value of compensation
equal to their present value of productivity. Any unanticipated plant shutdown
would cause permanent losses for experienced workers and the employers would not
directly share in these losses. A stronger case for program costs to be borne
directly by the employer can be made in this case.
The discussion so far has focused on losses that workers suffer after
displacement occurs. What about possible losses in the years prior to displace—'
ment?78 If employees anticipate forthcoming plant closings or layoffs, they
will cease their investments in firm—specific training and one should observe a
flattening in their age—earnings profiles prior to the displacement. In
contrast, if they fail to anticipate such displacements, they will continue
their investments and no such flattening will occur. In the later case, failure
by employers to provide workers with information that displacements were
forthcoming would have erroneously led workers to undertake investments that
were sure not to pay off. In fact, one careful study of displaced workers found
that the slope of age—earnings profiles did tend to flatten prior to displace-
ment for permanently laid—off workers but did not for workers involved in plant
—33—
shutdowns. Apparently layoffs tend to be anticipated, while plant shutdowns are
not.
The above finding provides a further rationale for advance notice for plant
closing (but not for layoffs) legislation; it would provide incentives for
workers not to make wasted investments in firm—specific training. Other
empirical evidence provides additional support for the policy. One Study in
Maine found that advanced notice did appear to speed up labor market adjustments
to plant closings; area unemployment rates peaked earlier in situations where
advanced notice took place, although long—run unemployment rates were not
affected.8° Another early study of thirty—two plant closings found that advance
notice of closings rarely led to inc!-eased quit rates or decreased produc-
tivity.8' To further protect against these things occurring, the receipt of
severance pay and/or job assistance programs could be restricted to employees
who remained with the plant until it shut down; this in fact is done in Maine.
Finally, it is estimated that over the last decade advanced notice permitted
about 60 cases of employee ownership to arise to avert plant shutdowns; these
'saved about 50,000 jobs and in only four or five cases did the firm subse-
quently go out of business.82
One should caution, however, that a study of the earnings loss displaced
workers suffer found that advanced notice provisions did not appear to reduce
earnings loss.83 The policy may aid worker transitions but it does not seem to
affect their long—run prospects. More generally, this and other studies
concluded that workers with high education levels and general skills suffer only
small earnings losses from labor market displacement.84 In contrast, unionized
workers in heavy manufacturing industries (e.g., steel and auto) suffer substan-
tial earnings loses, 25 percent plus, in the first two years after displacement
and still have annual losses in the range of 10 to 15 percent after six years.
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Given estimated wage differentials paid to union workers of at least this
amount, it is difficult to say how much of this loss merely represents that
dissipation of union rent. Finally, workers in less heavily unionized indus-
tries with higher rates of turnover, and where long—term attachment of workers
to firms is less prevalent, and less specific training occurs, suffer some
short—run losses but virtually no long—run losses.
A number of studies also indicate that older workers, women, and workers
with long tenure suffer the greatest losses from displacement.85 Earnings
losses also appear to be higher when area unemployment rates are high and in
relatively small labor market areas.86 These findings further support the
notion that labor market adjustment policies should be targeted.on. older workers
and that resource allocation formulas should have area unemployment rate
triggers, as various training and extended unemployment insurance benefit
programs have had in the past.
These earnings losses estimates do not take account of the effects of
existing income replacement programs, such as unemployment insurance and trade
adjustment assistance. In cases where displaced workers were eligible for trade
adjustment assistance, first year net income losses were substantially re-
duced.87 However, these benefits did not appear to affect long-run net income
losses and they did appear to increase displaced workers' duration of unemploy
tnent.88 To speed up the process of labor market readjustment, any plan that
proposes that compensation be paid to displaced workers probably should call for
lump sum payments, rather than weekly benefits while unemployed.
So far the discussion has ignored the role of unions. Workers covered by
collective bargaining in the United States have some protection against plant
closings. Employers must bargain with unions over the effects of plant closings
(e.g., severance pay, pension recall and transfer rights, seniority), although
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they are under no obligation to bargain over the decision to close.89 If a
union wants certain rights, such as advance notice of
anticipated closings, they
must win it at the bargaining table. Moreover, the recent Milwaukee Springs II
decision by the National Labor Relations Board affirms employers' rights to
transfer work from union plants to nonunion plants to avoid high union wages
during the course of a contract unless the language in the contract
specifically
prohibits it.9°
A recent survey of provisions relating to plant closing provisions in major
collective bargaining agreements (agreements covering one thousand or more
workers) found that over one—third contained some provisions relating to worker
participation in decisions about the effects of plant closing or relocation
decisions, with severance pay provisions being the most common.91 However, only
slightly more than ten percent of these contracts called for advanced notice.92
Presumably coverage in smaller agreements is less extensive.
While union protection against plant closings thus seems limited, it must
be remembered that one important role unions play is to acquire information and
to counicate it to members on the true economic conditions of the firms at
which they work. The study of the changes in the steepness of age—earnings
profiles prior to plant closings or layoffs discussed above also found that the
profiles became flatter for union members.93 Apparently they better
anticipated
labor market displacement than nonunion workers, and thus were less likely to
make wasted investments in firm—specific training. Furthermore, while there is
not yet evidence that unions win larger compensating wage differentials for
anticipated plant shutdowns or layoffs than the market produces for nonunion
workers, there is a growing body of literature relating to other unfavorable job
characteristics that suggests larger compensating differentials arise in the
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union sector.94 As with overtime hours and mployment—atwill legislation, the
major need for plant closing legislation may well be in the nonunion sector.
Finally, it must be stressed that whatever form plant closing legislation
takes it is subject to problems relating to bankruptcy and noncompliance. Almost
by definition bankrupt firms will not have the resources to fund benefits for
displaced workers and in the absence of substantial penalties for noncom-
pliance, incentives for compliance are limited. If the goal is to aid both
communities and displaced workers in a timely fashion, it seems clear that
public insurance of provision of benefits may be required in these cases. This
leads logically to the notion of a "Plant Shutdown Benefit Guarantee Corpora-
tion," which might be financed in an analogous manner to the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper has focused on four areas in which protective labor legislation
might be expanded in the United States over the next decade, specifically the
areas of hours of work, unjust dismissal, comparable worth, and plant shutdowns.
In each case I have tried to provide a rationale for government intervention, to
discuss if empirical evidence supports this rationale, to discuss potential
unintended side effects of the proposed policy changes that are relevant for
employment policy, and to discuss how proposed legislation might be structured.
Space and time constraints have precluded my consideration of a number of other
areas of likely expansion, including disability, retirement income, and occupa-
tional safety and health policies.
Several themes emerge from the paper that are worth mention. First, the
case for legislation and the appropriate form that legislation should take often
depend crucially on the empirical nature of labor markets. Are workers who are
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required to work overtime compensated in the form of higher wages? Do unjustly
dismissed workers typically suffer permanent losses? Do wage differentials by
gender arise because of occupational barriers? Have displaced workers who
invested in firm—specific skills been compensated for risk of displacement by
the market? Do wage profiles slope upward because of firm—specific training or
life—cycle incentive compensation arrangements? We unfortunately don't have
answers to some of these questions; they are required to design policies in the
areas discussed above.
Second, unionized workers, both directly through the collective bargaining
process and Indirectly through winning wage differentials to compensate them for
unfavorable job characteristics, appear to have much more protection in many of
these areas than do nonunion employees. The major beneficiaries of legislation
In these areas would be nonunion workers. While strong protective labor
legislation and strong unions coexist overseas, one wonders if the growth of
protective labor legislation in the United States would decrease the demand for
unions and further reduce the share of the workforce that is organized.
Third, there are reasons to propose size class exemptions in each of the
above areas. However, such exemptions stratify employment into a covered (large
establishment) Sector with "good" working conditions and a noncovered (small
establishment) sector with "poorer" conditions. The workers most in need of
protection may well be employed in smaller establishments; the design of the
legislation may frustrate its objectives.
Finally, it is worth restressing that what is seen as worker protection by
some, is seen as sources of economic inefficiency by others.96 While I have
tried to articulate many of the benefits and costs of proposed policies, and to
suggest in several places ways to minimize the costs, ultimately decisions about
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these policies will have to involve much more explicit value judgements than are
presented here.
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